26
27
SPILSBURY 7. R.
Fugitive Offenders Act, 1881. Morocco Order in Council, 1889. 24th March and 3rd May, 1899.
JUDICIAL COMMITTEE OF THE PRIVY COUNCIL: Earl of HALSBURY, L.C., and Lords WATSON, HOBHOUSE, MACNAUGHTON and DAVEY.
1 R. App. 1899, 392; 68 L.J. P.C. 66; 19 Cox C.C. 303.
The Supreme Court of Gibraltar, by an order of 5 September, 1898, ordered appellant to be tried before a Judge with or without assessors, in accordance with the Morocco Order in Council, 1889, and not with a jury of 12 men.
Upon appeal therefrom it was
Held: That "Section 38 of the Gibraltar Order in Council expressly applied to appellant's case. It was a criminal case depending before the Supreme Court of Gibraltar, which had concurrent original jurisdiction with the Court in Morocco. When once it is ascertained that the Supreme Court of Gibraltar was rightly seised of the jurisdiction to try, their Lordships think that the mode prescribed by the Gibraltar Order in Council must be pursued." Appellant was entitled to trial with a jury.
(Appellant was ultimately acquitted by a jury at Gibraltar.)
Further papers having subsequently been submitted by the German Government, Bluhm was again brought up on the 5th March and committed on four further cases.
An order nisi for a writ of habeas corpus was obtained on the grounds of there being no sufficient evidence within two months for his extradition; and of irregularity in any proceedings after the two months: and of there being no evidence of the identity of the accused with the person wanted in Germany.
Held: There was sufficient evidence produced in reference to the one case within two months of apprehension, and prisoner was therefore not entitled to the benefit of Article XII. In regard to the other grounds it seems to me that the proceedings were entirely regular. The right given by Article XII. to a person against whom a case had not been made is to be absolutely set at liberty: if that does not apply the procedure is to be the same as the procedure in this country. It may be that when he gets over to Germany, and he is tried there, he may be entitled to say, under Article VII., or under the provisions of the law of Germany in accordance with Article VII, I have only been properly extradited with reference to one of these charges. If that is a good point, he can make it in Germany, but he cannot make it here.”
IN RE JOSEPH BLUHM.
Germany.
15th March, 1901.
KING'S BENCH:
CHANNELL and BUCKNILL, JJ.
L.R. Q.B.D. 1901 (1) 764; 70 L.J. K.B. 472.
Bluhm was arrested on 15th December, 1900, on a provisional warrant for obtaining money by false pretences, and was remanded from time to time until the 14th February, 1901, the last day of the two months mentioned in Article XII. of the treaty with Germany, at which time the Magistrate had before him a requisition supported by a warrant and evidence in respect of one case, which was thus ready for committal-the Magistrate being satisfied with the evidence and a warrant and evidence relating to 31 other cases, which, having only been received by the Magistrate the preceding day, had not been all translated; and in respect of these 31 cases the Magistrate was not prepared to decide upon the evidence, and he therefore remanded the prisoner for a further week (at the same time informing the defendant that he considered the evidence upon the one case sufficient to justify him in committing the defendant for extradition). At the end of a week, on the 21st February, 1901, the Magistrate committed the prisoner for extradition on the one case, and on 30 of the 31 cases mentioned in the further warrant.
R. v. DIX.
U.S.A.
14th January, 1902
KING'S BENCH: DARLING and PHILLIMORE, JJ.
"Times," 15th January, 1902.
Dix had been committed for extradition for the crimes of larceny, embezzlement, and fraud by a banker or member or officer of a company, upon two informations showing (i.) that, while acting as manager of a bank, he received money on deposit knowing at the time that the bank was insolvent and in failing circumstances; (ii) that, while president and manager of a bank, he fraudulently discounted certain worthless bills with the bank, and drew cheques on the bank, which were honoured although his account was overdrawn; when the bank got into financial difficulties, the bills were found to be worthless, and prisoner owed the bank about $23,000.
A summons for a writ of habeas corpus was taken out.
It was
Admitted by the Attorney-General (appearing in support of the Magistrate's committal) that the first charge did not amount to larceny according to English law, and that the prisoner could not be extradited on that charge. And it was
Admitted by Mr. Biron (appearing for the prisoner) that the depositions as to the second charge made out a prima facie case of "larceny by embezzlement" within the definition of that offence in the Washington Statutes.
Held: That there was evidence of an offence within section 81 of the Larceny Act, 1861: it might be that in American law that would be called "larceny by embezzlement"; but the essential thing was to see whether what the evidence showed prima facie that the prisoner had done was a crime in
520
26
27
SPILSBURY 7. R.
Fugitive Offenders Act, 1881. Morocco Order in Council, 1889. 24th March and 3rd May, 1899.
JUDICIAL COMMITTEE OF THE PRIVY COUNCIL: Earl of HALSBORY, L.C., and Lords WATSON, HOBHOUSE, MACNAUGHTON and DAVEY.
1.R. App. 1899, 392; 68 L.J. P.C. 66; 19 Cox C.C. 303.
The Supreme Court of Gibraltar, by an order of 5 September, 1898, ordered appellant to be tried before a Judge with or without assessors, in accordance with the Morocco Order in Council, 1889, and not with a jury of 12 men.
Upon appeal therefrom it was
Held: That "Section 38 of the Gibraltar Order in Council expressly applied to appellant's case. It was a criminal case depending before the Supreme Court of Gibraltar, which had concurrent original jurisdiction with the Court in Morocco. When once it is ascertained that the Supreme Court of Gibraltar was rightly seised of the jurisdiction to try, their Lordships think that the mode prescribed by the Gibraltar Order in Council must be pursued." Appellant was entitled to trial with a jury.
(Appellant was ultimately acquitted by a jury at Gibraltar.)
Further papers having subsequently been submitted by the German Govern- ment, Bluhm was again brought up on the 5th March and committed on four further cases.
An order nisi for a writ of habeas corpus was obtained on the grounds of there being no sufficient evidence within two months for his extradition; and of irregularity in any proceedings after the two months: and of there being no evidence of the identity of the accused with the person wanted in Germany.
Held: There was sufficient evidence produced in reference to the one case within two months of apprehension, and prisoner was therefore not entitled to the benefit of Article XII, In regard to the other grounds it seems to me that the proceedings were entirely regular. The right given by Article XII. to a person against whom a case had not been made is to be absolutely set at liberty: if that does not apply the procedure is to be the same as the procedure in this country. It Hay be
that when he gets over to Germany, and he is tried there, he may be entitled to say, under "Article VII., or under the provisions of the law of Germany in accordance with Article VII, I have only been properly extradited with reference to one of these charges. If that is à good point. he can make it in Germany, but he cannot make it here.”
IN RE JOSEPH BLUHM.
Germany.
15th March, 190).
KING'S BENCH:
CHANNELL and BUCKNILL, JJ.
L.R. Q.B.D. 1901 (1) 764; 70 L.J. K.B. 472.
Bluhm was arrested on 15th December, 1900, on a provisional warrant for obtaining money by false pretences, and was remanded from time to time until the 14th February, 1901, the last day of the two months mentioned in Article XII. of the treaty with Germany, at which time the Magistrate had before him a requisition supported by a warrant and evidence in respect of one case, which was thus ready for committal-the Magistrate being satisfied with the evidence and a warrant and evidence relating to 31 other cases, which, having only been received by the Magistrate the preceding day, had not been all translated; and in respect of these 31 cases the Magistrate was not prepared to decide upon the evidence, and he therefore remanded the prisoner for a further week (at the same time informing the defendant that he considered the evidence upon the one case sufficient to justify him in committing the defendant for extradition). At the end of a week, on the 21st February, 1901, the Magistrate committed the prisoner for extradition on the one case, and on 30 of the 31 cases mentioned in the further warrant.
f
R. v. DIX.
U.S.A.
14th January, 1902
KING'S BENCH: DARLING and PHILLIMORE, JJ.
"Times," 15th January, 1902.
Dix had been committed for extradition for the crimes of larceny, embezzlement, and fraud by a banker or member or officer of a company, upon two informations showing (i.) that, while acting as manager of a bank, he received money on deposit knowing at the time that the bank was insolvent and in failing circumstances; (ii) that, while president and manager of a bank, he fraudulently discounted certain worthless bills with the bank, and drew cheques on the bank, which were honoured although his account was over- drawn; when the bank got into financial difficulties, the bills were found to be worthless, and prisoner owed the bank about $23,000.
A summons for a writ of habeas corpus was taken out.
It was
Admitted by the Attorney-General (appearing in support of the Magistrate's committal) that the first charge did not amount to larceny according to English law, and that the prisoner could not be extradited on that charge. And it was
Admitted by Mr. Biron (appearing for the prisoner) that the depositions as to the second charge made out a prima facie case of "larceny by embezzlement" within the definition of that offence in the Washington Statutes.
Held: That there was evidence of an offence within section 81 of the Larceny Act, 1861: it might be that in American law that would be called "larceny by embezzlement"; but the essential thing was to see whether what the evidence showed primú facie that the prisoner had done was a crime in
520
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